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Abstract
Vaccine misinformation online may contribute to the
increase of anti-vaccine sentiment and vaccine-hesitant
behaviors. Social network data was used to identify
Twitter vaccine influencers, their online twitter
communities, and their geolocations to determine provaccine and vaccine-hesitant online communities. We
explored 139,433 tweets and identified 420 vaccine
Twitter influencers—opinion leaders and assessed
13,487 of their tweets and 7,731 of their connections.
Semantic network analysis was employed to determine
twitter conversation themes. Results suggest that
locating social media influencers is an efficient way to
identify and target vaccine-hesitant communities online.
We discuss the implications of using this process for
public health education and disease management.

1. Introduction
Vaccine-hesitant parents have been shown to favor
information from the internet rather than from health
care providers or credible health organizations [1].
Similarly, vaccine-hesitant parents rely on information
shared on social media platforms, specifically from
family, friends, and social media influencers or opinion
leaders, to inform vaccine decisions [2]. Unfortunately,
online information and information coming from
opinion leaders have been found to often provide
inaccurate and misleading information [3]. Outside of
the vaccine-hesitant community, information is driven
by scientific evidence but this evidence is often misused
in vaccine-hesitant communities [4]. Furthermore,
research finds that if current trends continue, antivaccine views on social media will dominate the online
vaccine discussion within 10-years [5]. This trend is
based on data that shows that while online antivaccine
groups have fewer followers than online pro-vaccine
groups, the antivaccine groups are more numerous,
more connected to undecided groups, and growing more
connected at a faster pace.
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10125/71096
978-0-9981331-4-0
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

George A. Barnett
University of California, Davis
gabarnett@ucdavis.edu

The online antivaccine groups are more effectively
connected at both a global and local level, unlike provaccine groups who are less locally focused [5]. The
antivaccine influencers then, are highly connected and
occupy a central place in online forums. Generally,
online opinion leaders have a lot of followers and tend
to be central in their networks which results in their
posts receiving a great number of responses in the form
of likes/favorites, replies, and shares. Often social media
influencers limit communication to specific topic areas
and they dependably update “audiences” with consistent
content but also are very responsive to their audience’s
diverse concerns all of which helps to increase their
persuasive influence.
This persuasive influence can be seen on various
social media platforms, including Twitter. Twitter, a
popular microblogging site where users post short
messages or “tweets” with a 280 character limit can also
include multimedia content and hyperlinks to other
content on various sites. Hashtags are also often
included with tweets and these form hyperlinks that
connect tweets and have the potential to reach a large
audience.
In this study, Twitter was selected for assessment
because of its popularity, wide-spread use, and the
potential for users to follow anyone. We used
information diffusion, a widely used method [6] where
the reaction to influencer tweets is assessed to define
social media influencers. Through social network
analysis, we identified Twitter vaccine-information
(pro- and antivaccine) communities and their
geolocations. We focused on tweets for three childhood
vaccines, measles, mumps, rubella (MMR); tetanus,
diphtheria, pertussis (Tdap); and human papillomavirus
(HPV). Our goal was to provide insights for public
health researchers and health care professionals on
efficient forms
of locating vaccine-hesitant
communities to better target vaccine communication for
childhood vaccine promotion.
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2. Methods
This study employed social network community
detection and semantic network analysis (SNA) to
identify pro- and antivaccine influencers, their
communities, and geolocations on Twitter specific to
the three childhood vaccinations previously mentioned.
A sentiment analysis was performed to assess if Twitter
conversations were negative, neutral, or positive in
overall sentiment.

2.1. Data collection
Tweets about childhood vaccinations (MMR, Tdap,
HPV) were collected from July 1, 2018, to October 15,
2018. These vaccines were selected to capture more
widely discussed childhood vaccines (MMR and Tdap)
as well as newer vaccine recommendations (HPV).
This timeframe coincided with the peak period of a
measles outbreak in Europe and the growing spread of
measles in the U.S., as well as the start of the U.S.
school-year, which requires parents to indicate child
vaccination status for public school enrollment. This
period included a more recent, at the time, a recordhigh measles outbreak in Europe which would provide
information on how the growing concern was
discussed on Twitter.
Data were collected from Twitter’s Premium API
using Boolean search methods with the keywords,
“vaccine,” “vaccination,” “vax,” “shot,”
“immunization,” “immunisation,” in combination with
the three childhood vaccines selected for analysis
(MMR, Tdap, HPV). The entire archive of English
language tweets within the noted 15-week period was
included along with tweet information (i.e. number of
retweets, replies, and favorites), and sender
information, such as geolocation and number of
followers.

2.2. Identifying influencers
The tweet data was collected, organized, and
cleaned using R (version 3.4.4). Social media
influencers were identified by normalizing retweet
counts, favorite counts, and reply counts of each tweet
and multiplying the three values per the information
diffusion method. Tweets with values greater than zero
were selected as an influence measure. This measure
followed a power-law distribution, from which we
obtained the 420 senders with the greatest measured
value and their lists of friends.
After collecting the sender’s lists and extracting
their social connections with followers an edge list of
7,731 connections was created. The edge list was
imported into Gephi [7] for network detection. Gephi

was also used to calculate and visualize the social
networks of the 420 vaccine influencers.

2.3. Detecting communities and geolocations
Modularity, a community detection method that
shows different clusters, or groups, by determining the
fraction of links that fall within a given group, was
employed to detect the communities among the 420
influencers. As a rule of thumb, modularity of .4 or
greater indicates the presence of separate communities
[8]. Based on their community, each sender’s location
information was extracted and summarized. The
location summary included country, and state name, if
the country was the U.S., for each community. Because
our data was based on English language tweets, most
locations identified were English-speaking countries.

2.4. Semantic network analysis (SNA)
After cleaning the tweet text data, it was separated
into different files based on each sender’s community.
Text files were preprocessed using ConText [9] to
remove syntactically functioning words and stem
different forms of the same word. The remaining text
was analyzed for word frequency. Next, semantic
matrices were generated using the edited texts based on
word co-occurrence.
The basic network data set is an n x n matrix S,
where n equals the number of nodes (words) in the
analysis, and sij is the measured relationship between
nodes i and j with the node serving as the unit of
analysis. Here, the nodes are identified based on the
weighted frequencies of the words. The measurement
of word co-occurrence is the standard for creating links
between words in a semantic network. Words were
considered linked if they co-occurred within three
words of each other. The frequencies of word cooccurrence were then calculated and ranked. Word
order, or direction, was not considered in the semantic
network analysis. Gephi [7] was used to create
semantic networks and their visualizations, as well as
to assess network measures.

2.5. Sentiment analysis
Sentiment analysis from IBM Watson Natural
Language Understanding (NLU) [10] was used to
assess the percentages of positive, negative, and neutral
tweets for each community. NLU uses deep learning to
extract metadata from text and identifies the attitudes,
opinions, or feelings in the text. This analysis considers
both the polarity of individual words and the sequence
of the text. Twitter data was used to train NLU making
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it an especially appropriate sentiment analysis tool for
this assessment [11].

3. Results
3.1. Community and geolocation detection
The community detection algorithm revealed three
distinct communities among vaccine influencers
(Figure 1). The modularity was .52, indicating
meaningful community detection. While the global
network density was 0.05, the within-community
densities were 0.33 (the orange community), 0.16 (the
green community), and 0.20 (the blue community),
with an average of 0.23, 4.6 times greater than the
overall density, a further indication of separate groups.
Also, the pairwise density was 0.14 for orange and
blue, 0.12 for orange and green, and 0.11 for blue and
green. Lastly, the orange community (5243 tweets)
consisted of 33.81% of the whole network, the green
community (4263 tweets) was 38.57%, and the blue
community (3981 tweets) took the rest at 27.62%.

of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC). The green community was dominated by
influencers from California, New York, Texas,
Washington D.C., and Maryland. Again, this
community was comprised of the most populous states
plus the home of both the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) and the Federal government. The blue
community represented influencers from IE and the
UK.
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Figure 2. Country of origin by community

3.2. Pro- or antivaccine determination

Figure 1. Influencer community detection results
Influencer geolocations for each community were
extracted based on their Twitter personal information.
The top three countries represented in these
communities were the United States (USA), United
Kingdom (UK), and Ireland (IE) (Figure 2). Both the
orange and green communities were dominated by
influencers from the U.S. The orange community was
made up of influencers from California, New York,
Texas, Georgia, and Florida. These states include some
of the most populous states in the U.S. plus the home

Influencers were ranked based on their popularity
score to locate the top 20 influencers from each
community. The results of the influencer rankings were
used to identify the community as pro- or antivaccine.
The Children’s Health Defense, an NGO focused on
antivaccine activism and headed by Robert F.
Kennedy, Jr. was the number one influencer in the
orange community. This influencer was followed by
three accounts held by individuals with obvious
antivaccine stances. The green community revealed the
World Health Organization as the top influencer
followed by two media organizations and the National
Cancer Institute. Finally, National Health Service, a
UK health provider, was the blue community’s top
influencer followed by two more government accounts.
To further distinguish a community’s stance on
vaccination (i.e. pro- or anti-), we performed a
descriptive analysis for all three identified
communities based on the top 20 influencer accounts
for each community. Results showed the orange
community to be antivaccine comprised of more
antivaccine advocates, organizations, and individuals.
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The green and blue communities were largely provaccine communities with the green community
encompassing more diverse influencer types and the
blue community focusing on vaccination promotion as
a means for preventing cancer.
The theme(s) for each community were also
identified based on the top associations in each
community’s semantic network. The orange
community was mostly concerned with highlighting
the dangers of childhood vaccines. The most central
words were vaccination, autism, and MMR (Figure 3).
The green community involved the promotion of the
HPV and MMR vaccines specifically but vaccinations
in general as a means to protect from and prevent
disease. The most central words in the green
community were vaccination, get, and vaccineswork
(Figure 4). The blue community focused on extending
and encouraging vaccination rates for boys in Ireland
for the HPV vaccine. The most central words for this
community were HPV, vaccine, and boy (Figure 5).
For Figures 3, 4, and 5, the size of the word label
indicated how frequently the word occurred. The
thickness of each link represented the weight or
number of co-occurrences between two words. The
more closely related the words were, the shorter the
link distance. The color of each semantic network
(based on senders’ network community) matches the
color of their sender network community color.

Figure 4. SNA results for the green community

Figure 5. SNA results for the blue community

3.3. Sentiment analysis

Figure 3. SNA results for the orange community

Chi-square tests were conducted to evaluate the
significance of proportional differences among the
communities. Sentiment in the orange community was
the most negative among the three communities (p >
.05). The blue community displayed the most positive
sentiment among the three communities (p > .05) and
the green community presented the most neutral tweets
among the three (p > .05) (Table 1.).
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Table 1. Sentiment analysis results
Sentiment labels frequency (%)
Community
(N)
Orange
(5243)
Green
(4263)
Blue
(3981)

Negative

Neutral

Positive

3108
(59.28%)
1925
(45.16%)
2084
(52.42%)

1677
(32%)
1880
(44.10%)
1190
(29.9%)

458
(8.7%)
458
(10.74%)
704
(17.68%)

4. Discussion
This study used the identification of social media
influencers to detect Twitter childhood vaccine
communities and their geolocations. We confirmed that
Twitter social media influencers formed independent
communities online around the topic of childhood
vaccination. The stated positions of each Twitter
community were determined through semantic network
analysis. The antivaccine community was more
connected within when compared to the pro-vaccine
communities. Pairwise density results did not show the
antivaccine community as being independent of the provaccine communities further highlighting the
interconnectedness of the Twitter antivaccine
community. This interconnectedness was lacking in the
pro-vaccine Twitter communities. These results are in
line with recent research that found pro-vaccine
Facebook groups discuss vaccination issues mainly with
each other rather than reaching out to vaccine-neutral
groups or anti-vaccination groups [5]. This is unlike the
antivaccine groups that do connect more widely to
vaccine-neutral and pro-vaccination groups.
According to the semantic network analysis, the
anti-vaccine community propagated misinformation
about vaccines in addition to using anti-vaccine rhetoric.
This conclusion supports previous research results that
found online anti-vaccine information to include
deceptive vaccine information [12, 13]. Sentiment
analysis found the majority of tweets to be negative in
sentiment. This can likely be attributed to the more rapid
spread of negative emotions [14]. Considering that
popular tweets tend to be more negative in sentiment,[1]it
can be expected to find more negative tweets across the
communities assessed. Furthermore, vaccines treat
diseases, a concept with a generally negative sentiment.
The proliferation of misinformation about vaccines
[2]
in antivaccine communities can be largely attributed to
the make-up of the different Twitter vaccine
communities. For example, a descriptive analysis of [3]
the
top 20 Twitter influencers on childhood vaccination
found that the antivaccine community distributed
information from emerging vaccine-information

websites, personal blogs, and parent-organized groups.
The pro-vaccine community, on the other hand,
circulated news sourced from traditional mainstream
media who obtain information from various reputable
health organizations.
Our study shows that using social media influencers
to identify antivaccine Twitter communities can be an
effective strategy for targeting vaccine misinformation.
Rather than monitoring large numbers of tweets, efforts
can be focused on influencers and their communities.
Moreover, promoting accurate vaccine information
through social media influencer accounts will ensure a
larger number of Twitter users receive the information.
Their large and well-connected networks provide more
efficient information coverage.
Like all studies, this research has its limitations.
First, we concentrated our assessment on Englishlanguage tweets. Twitter conversations on the topic of
childhood vaccinations may differ based on language.
Considering tweets in additional languages would also
likely change the geolocation of tweets. Similarly, this
research focused on Twitter as opposed to information
from other social media platforms such as Facebook,
Instagram, or Weibo. The procedures described in this
study may be generalized beyond public health to assess
different topics within social media where the goal is
social influence. One particular case would be to specify
the “echo chambers” that exist in political-ideological
communities.
Detecting online vaccine communities and their user
geolocations through the identification of social media
influencers provides an efficient means for public health
officials to more accurately target antivaccine and
vaccine-neutral groups to provide accurate vaccine
information, answer vaccine safety concerns, counteract
vaccine misinformation, and monitor vaccine
misinformation spread more efficiently. Lastly,
knowing the geolocation clusters for these communities
provides valuable information for monitoring gaps in
vaccination coverage and may assist in predicting
disease outbreak.
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